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Abstract
There is a strong demand for precise means for the comparison of
logics in terms of expressiveness both from theoretical and from appli-
cation areas. The aim of this paper is to propose a sufficiently general
and reasonable formal criterion for expressiveness, so as to apply not only
to model-theoretic logics, but also to Tarskian and proof-theoretic log-
ics. For model-theoretic logics there is a standard framework of relative
expressiveness, based on the capacity of characterizing structures, and a
straightforward formal criterion issuing from it. The problem is that it
only allows the comparison of those logics defined within the same class
of models. The urge for a broader framework of expressiveness is not new.
Nevertheless, the enterprise is complex and a reasonable model-theoretic
formal criterion is still wanting. Recently there appeared two criteria in
this wider framework, one from Garc´ıa-Matos & Va¨a¨na¨nen and other from
L. Kuijer. We argue that they are not adequate. Their limitations are
analysed and we propose to move to an even broader framework lack-
ing model-theoretic notions, which we call “translational expressiveness”.
There is already a criterion in this later framework by Mossakowski et al.,
however it turned out to be too lax. We propose some adequacy criteria
for expressiveness and a formal criterion of translational expressiveness
complying with them is given.
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1 Introduction
It is very common for those who work with logic to make comparisons such as
“the logic L′ is more expressive than L”, “L′ is stronger than L”, “L is included
in L′”, “L can be reduced to L′”, etc. Such assertions are often made on impre-
cise grounds and, though possibly being non-ambiguous and non-problematic,
the lack of clarity around the usage of these concepts can generate terminolog-
ical confusion across the literature (e.g. [Hum05]) and harden the comparison
of formal results.
In the literature, the notion of logic inclusion or sub-logic (these terms will be
used interchangeably here) is pretty much linked with language and axiomatic
extensions, which on their turn are linked with “strength”, that is, the capacity
of proving theorems or having valid formulas. Now the concept of sub-logic is
sometimes associated with strength and sometimes associated with expressive-
ness, and sometimes with both (e.g. in [Be´z99]), which is known to be the case of
paradoxes [MDT09]. Three kinds of systems are relevant here: model-theoretic
logics, Tarskian and proof-theoretic logics, they will now be briefly defined. A
logic L is called model-theoretic if it is defined semantically and presented as a
sequence (F ,M,), where F is a set of formulas, M is a class of models and
 is a satisfaction relation on M×F . A logic L is Tarskian if it is defined as
(F ,⊢), where ⊢ is a consequence relation on F (possibly multi-consequence).
Finally, L is a proof-theoretic logic if it is defined as (F ,R), where R is a set of
inference rules.1
1Some additional criteria are usually imposed for a system to qualify as one of these three
kinds, but they are immaterial here.
3In model-theoretic logics there is a straightforward approach to expressive-
ness that is also reasonably taken as a definition of logic inclusion: a logic L2
is at least as expressive/includes L1 if every class of structures characterizable
in L1 is also characterizable in L2 (see e.g. [Lin74, p. 129] and [BF85]). This
naturally only holds for logics defined within the same class of structures. If
one wants also to compare logics defined within different classes of structures,
then it does not seem adequate to use the concept of sub-logic, as we shall see
below. It is better to use the concept of expressiveness.
There is no straightforward approach to expressiveness for Tarskian and
proof-theoretic logics (TPL, for short). As for sub-logic, in TPL it is also linked
with language and axiomatic extensions. However, we can often see “sub-logic”
relations taken in a wider sense, i.e. when, for two given logics L and L′,
it happens that L′ is not a language/axiomatic extension of L, but there is
a certain mapping of L-formulas into L′-formulas respecting the consequence
relation. These cases are normally interpreted as saying that L is included-
/embeddable/reconstructible/interpretable/can be simulated in L′. We propose
to call these as expressiveness relations whenever they can be seen as modeling
the following intuition
(E)
For every L-sentence φ, there is an L′-sentence ψ with the same
meaning.
This same intuitive explanation of expressiveness holds for model-theoretic
logics, and is used as a basis for formal criteria therein (e.g. [BF85, p. 42]).
Thus we can have a reasonably homogeneous concept for comparing logics:
that of expressiveness. We shall reserve the term “sub-logic” just when there
are axiomatic or language extensions, and we shall not use the term “strength”
because it is ambiguous between expressive and deductive strength.
A precise definition for the notion of relative expressiveness for model-theoretic
logics was given already in the 1970s (e.g. in [Lin74] and [Bar74]). As we said,
this definition is based on the capacity of characterizing structures and under-
lies each of the so-called Lindstro¨m-type theorems,2 which form the basis of
abstract model theory.
Single-class expressiveness Considering model-theoretic logics defined within
the same class of structures, the above intuition can be captured easily since
there is a common ground where sentences can be compared. This common
ground is easily achieved by defining the meaning of a sentence φ in a logic
L = (F ,M,L) as {U ∈ M|U L φ} (ModL(φ), for short). Thus we call this
framework single-class expressiveness. Since every sentence in L1 is mapped to
a sentence in L2 having the same meaning, this framework of expressiveness
can be seen as consisting of certain formula-mappings between model-theoretic
logics. A formal definition for it is then straightforward. Let τ be a signature
and let L1 = (F1,M,L1) and L2 = (F2,M,L2) be model-theoretic logics.
2That is, theorems of the form “If a logical system L′ is at least as expressive as L and
have properties P1, ..., Pn, then L′ is as expressive as L”; see e.g. [BF85], [vBTCV09] and
[OP10].
4Definition 1.1 (4EC). L2 is at least as expressive as L1 (L1 4EC L2) if and
only if (iff, for short) for every τ−sentence φ ∈ F1 there is a τ−sentence ψ ∈ F2
such that ModL1(φ) =ModL2(ψ).
Notice that here the class of models M is the same for both L1 and L2,
and φ, ψ share the same non-logical symbols. The above definition can be para-
phrased in terms of elementary classes:3 L 4EC L
′ iff every elementary class of
L is an elementary class of L′.
Despite being the basis for many important results, 4EC is very limited.
It is not only restricted to model-theoretic logics, but it requires the classes of
structures being compared to share the same signature. As a consequence, it
only allows the comparison of logics defined within the same class of structures.
The urge for a broader definition is not new.4 A straightforward means of
extension already appears in [BF85] and is examined in [Sha91]. Using the
notion of projective class, one can loosen the above definition allowing that L′
is at least as expressive as L iff every elementary class of L is a projective class
in L′ (L 4PC L′) (ibid, p. 232).
Even among those expressiveness results using 4EC , we can notice some
flexibility in its application. One such example appears in [AFFM11], where the
definition of 4EC above is given, but afterwards (p. 307) it is informally relaxed
in order to allow changes of signature, thus the proper definition being used
appears to be the one based on projective classes (4PC). The problem is that
elsewhere we get different results depending on whether we use 4EC or 4PC ,
as Shapiro showed [Sha91, p. 232]: L(Q0) 64EC L(A) and L(A) 64EC L(Q0),
but L(Q0) 4PC L(A) and L(A) 4PC L(Q0).5
Remaining within model-theoretic logics, a wider framework —let us call it
multi-class—would comprise besides formula-mappings also structure-mappings,
thus allowing structures of one logic to be mapped to structures of the other.
This would enable the comparison of logics defined within different classes of
structures. Recently there appeared two formal definitions of multi-class ex-
pressiveness, to wit [GMV07] and [Kui14]. In the sequence we will present them
and argue that they are not adequate.
There have been also early claims outside abstract model-theory relating
logics in the sense of (E) above, but no explicit definitions of the main concepts
involved were given. Go¨del used his result on the interpretation of classical into
intuitionistic logic to infer that, contrary to the appearances, it is classical logic
that is contained in intuitionistic logic [Go¨d01, p. 295]. Since then, there fol-
lowed many results of interpretations, embeddings, reconstructions, simulations,
etc. among Tarskian and proof-theoretic logics. Such results have often been
3For some signature τ , a class K of τ -structures is elementary in a logic L iff there is an
L-sentence φ such that K = {U | U L φ}. A class K of τ -structures is a projective class of L
if for some τ ′ ⊇ τ there is an L-elementary τ ′-class K′ such that K = {U′↾τ | U′ ∈ K′}, where
U′↾τ is the τ -reduct of U′.
4See [Tar86, p. 358], [Mes89, p. 299], [Sha91, p. 232] and [CK90, p. 130].
5The logic L(Q0) is the first-order logic extended with the quantifier “there exists infinitely
many”, and L(A) is the first-order logic with the “ancestral” operation A, i.e. Axy(Rxy) says
that x is an ancestor of y in the relation R.
5used to justify some statement of inclusion or relative expressiveness between
the logics at issue.6 We proposed to call those with the underlying intuition (E)
as expressiveness results. Naturally, this notion of expressiveness is no longer di-
rectly linked with the capacity of characterizing structures as in model-theoretic
logics, rather it resides in the capacity of a logic to “encode” another. Let the
framework of expressiveness based on such capacity be named “translational
expressiveness”.7
As opposed to the case of model-theoretic logics, until recently there was
no attempt to give a precise definition of relative expressiveness in this frame-
work. To the best of our knowledge, Mossakowski et al. [MDT09] were the first
to give an explicit formal definition of translational expressiveness for logics,
that is, an expressiveness relation based on the existence of certain kinds of
formula-mappings. We will expose their definition and show that it is still not
adequate. Then, some adequacy criteria for expressiveness are proposed and a
formal criterion for translational expressiveness is given.
Structure of the paper
This paper presents the following panorama on relative expressiveness between
logics:
(*) Relative expressiveness between logics (intuitive concept as given by (E))
(a) Adequacy criteria for expressiveness
→ Approaches to (*) hopefully satisfying (a)

single-class

formal proposals: 4EC , 4PC

multi-class

formal proposals: 4gv, expressivenessg

translational

formal proposals: Mossakowski et al.’s and expressivenessgg.
In §2 the framework of multi-class expressiveness will be presented and two
formal criteria will be analysed, one from [GMV07] (4gv) and other from [Kui14]
(expressivenessg). We argue that, using the intuitive explanation of expressive-
ness given above, there are counterexamples to both. In the sequence, we inves-
tigate what is wrong with them and propose that moving to an even wider frame-
work, encompassing a greater range of logics and lacking structure-mappings,
might be promising.
6E.g. [Tho74b, p. 154], [Wo´j88, p. 67], [Hum00, p. 441], [Hum05, p. 163], [Con05, p.
233], [CCD09, p. 15] and the recent [AA17, p. 207].
7The term is borrowed from [Pet12]. Curiously, the same kind of problem appeared in
computer science: there was a multitude of programming languages and process calculi and
many informal claims relating the expressive power of such, through the existence of certain
encodings of one into another. This situation fomented a series of works aiming at a stan-
dardization of such “expressibility results” (e.g. [Fel90], [Par08] and [Gor10]). Though aimed
at different objects, it is still possible to learn from this enterprise and propose the first steps
of a standardization of a definition of relative expressiveness.
6In §3 we present Mossakowski et al.’s formal criterion for translational ex-
pressiveness and show that, due to a result of [Jerˇ12], it is still not adequate.
Then, some basic adequacy criteria for expressiveness will be proposed. In
the sequence we analyse some formal conditions related to translations already
appearing in the literature and investigate whether they satisfy the adequacy
criteria. Finally, a formal sufficient condition for translational expressiveness
(expressivenessgg) is proposed. We will argue that expressivenessgg satisfies
the criteria and is materially adequate.
2 Multi-class expressiveness
2.1 M. Garc´ıa-Matos and J. Va¨a¨na¨nen on sub-logic
Garc´ıa-Matos and Va¨a¨na¨nen gave a multi-class definition of sub-logic. Their
definition is similar to one given in [Mes89] but is laxer.8 Seemingly, they
treat the term “sub-logic” as synonymous with “expressiveness” (exchanging the
order of terms, naturally), since they present the Lindstro¨m theorems as being
about sub-logic, whereas they are presented by one of the authors elsewhere as
being about expressiveness (e.g. [vBTCV09]). We shall argue that the relation
defined must be seen as an expressiveness relation, and it will be shown that
as an expressiveness relation, it has important downsides. Let us consider their
definition of sub-logic [GMV07, p. 21]:
Definition 2.2. A logic L = (F ,M,) is a sub-logic of L′ = (F ′,M′,′) (in
symbols L 4gv L′) if there are a sentence θ ∈ F ′ and functions f :M′ −→M,
T : F −→ F ′ such that:
(a) For every U ∈M exists a U′ ∈M′ such that f(U′) = U and U′ ′ θ
(b) For every φ ∈ F and for every U′ ∈ M′, if U′ ′ θ, then (U′ ′ T (φ) iff
f(U′)  φ)
Thus, if the class of structures M′ of a logic L′ is richer than the class of
structures M of a logic L, one could still allow a comparison between L and
L′, by restricting M′ to the translatable structures, i.e. those U′ which satisfy
some condition θ and then use a function f to translate this reduced class of
L′-structures into L-structures.
2.2.1 A problem with 4gv
Let L = (F ,M,) be a trivial propositional logic in some given signature,
and let (M, v) be the set of is truth tables together with a valuation. Let
L′ = (F ′,M′,′) be any logic that has at least one valid sentence δ and let the
formula θ of the definition above be such δ. Define the following mappings
8Garc´ıa-Matos and Va¨a¨na¨nen’s approach is a non-signature indexed version of the “map
of logics” in [Mes89, p. 299]. In Meseguer’s paper, it is not allowed for sub-logic mappings
that sentences in the source logic be mapped to theories in the target logic, and the formula-
mappings must be injective.
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• f :M′ −→M. For every U′ ∈M′, f(U′) = (M, v).
• T : F −→ F ′. For every φ ∈ F , T (φ) = δ.
Then it is easily seen that both items (a) and (b) above are satisfied.
Thus, according to this definition of sub-logic, every logic containing at least
one valid formula has a trivial sub-logic. If we think on the usual meaning
given to “sub-logic”, this not plausible at all, since the logic (F ′,M′,′) could
be non-trivial and might even lack a trivializing particle, so how come it could
have a trivial sub-logic?9
It is not enough to require that the mapping T be injective. Using an idea
of [CCD09, p. 14], take for target logic any L∗ = (F∗,M∗,∗) that has a
denumerable number of valid formulas δ1, δ2, ... and define the mapping from
the formulas of the trivial logic F = {φ1, φ2, ...} to L∗-formulas as T (φi) = δi.
Still we have that L∗ has a trivial sub-logic, once more, L∗ may be any logic
with a denumerable number of validities, also lacking a trivializing particle.
Naturally, the usual senses of logic inclusion, that is, through language or
axiomatic extensions do not apply here. The only way to make sense of this is
to interpret the above cases as saying that a trivial logic can be simulated in any
logic containing at least one validity. This capacity of simulating a logic is an
expressive capacity, therefore the definition above is better seen as a definition
of expressiveness. Yet, as an expressiveness relation, it is noteworthy that no
restriction on the translation functions f and T are imposed, so one may wonder
whether the definition over-generates.
We are not in position to settle definitively this question. However we will
give a plausibility argument to the effect that we should impose stricter con-
ditions on model- and formula-mappings, since there is a natural and reason-
able extension of the above definition that indeed over-generates. Though not,
strictly speaking, a counter-example, the case to be presented below shall give
evidence that there is an intrinsic problem with the above proposal for multi-
class expressiveness.
As we said, the sentence θ on the above definition of 4gv is intended to cut
L′-structures that are meaningless from the point of view of L. Apparently, it
would do no harm to the idea behind 4gv to allow θ to be a recursive set of
sentences, as it is normally done in works dealing with translations of logics
and conversion of structures (e.g. [Man96, p. 270]). This would be useful if the
logics at issue have no conjunction, so that θ could be a finite set of sentences; or
if the low expressive power of the logics L and L′ makes that the L′-structures
to be reduced into L-structures be only characterizable through an infinite but
recursive set of L′-sentences. This happens in the case of many-sorted logic
(MSL) and FOL. If θ is not allowed to be an infinite set of sentences, then
MSL would not be a sub-logic, in the above sense, ofFOL, which is implausible.
Though the conversion of FOL-structures into MSL-structures is mentioned
9This counter-example was based on another one given in [CC02, p. 385-6], which was
given as an argument for strengthening the notion of translation used.
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[GMV07, p. 23], the case of a given FOL-signature τ containing infinitely-
many unary symbols S1, S2, ... is not considered. To convert τ -structures into
MSL-structures then one needs to make sure that unary predicates S1, S2, ..
to be converted to many-sorted domains are non-empty. This would only be
accomplished by setting θ = {∃xS1(x), ∃xS2(x), ...} [Man96, p. 260].
However, if one allows such modification another implausible situation oc-
curs. Consider the classical propositional logic (CPL) and a propositional logic
WPL, defined by Be´ziau [Be´z99]. WPL shares all the definitions of the classical
propositional connectives, except for negation, where it has only one “half” of
its clause: for aWPL-modelM and formula φ, ifM(φ) = T , thenM(¬φ) = F ;
the converse direction does not hold.
Be´ziau shows that there is a translation from CPL into WPL. Below we
will give Mossakowski et al.’s presentation of it, which includes also a model
translation [MDT09, p. 107]. Given an n-ary connective #, a translation T is
literal for # if T (#(φ1, ..., φn)) = #(T (φ1), ..., T (φn)); for an atomic formula
p, T is literal when T (p) = p. Define the mapping (T , f) : CPL −→ WPL as
follows:
• T : FCPL −→ FWPL
– T (¬φ) = T (φ)→ ¬(T (φ)),
– literal for ∧,∨,→ and atomic formulas;
• and f :MWPL −→MCPL
– f(MWPL, v) = (MCPL, v),
whereM comprises the truth-tables for each connective and v a valuation on the
propositional variables. Notice that f takes a WPL-model, keeps the valuation
v and replaces the truth-tables for the corresponding CPL ones.
Then we have that
Theorem 2.3 (Mossakowski et al.).
f(MWPL, v) CPL φ if and only if (M
WPL, v) WPL T (φ).
The model mapping f is surjective, so that it obeys (a) above.
Now Mossakowski et al. (ibid, p. 100) define a mapping also from WPL to
CPL using an auxiliary set of formulas ∆ constructed out of CPL-formulas.
Define the mapping (T ′, f ′,∆) :WPL −→ CPL as follows:
• T ′ : FWPL −→ FCPL
– For every φ ∈ FWPL, T ′(φ) = pφ, where pφ is a propositional vari-
able.
Define ∆ as the following set of formulas, for φ, ψ ∈ FWPL:
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• T ′(φ ∧ ψ)↔ T ′(φ) ∧ T ′(ψ)
• T ′(φ ∨ ψ)↔ T ′(φ) ∨ T ′(ψ)
• T ′(φ→ ψ)↔ T ′(φ)→ T ′(ψ)
• T ′(φ)→ ¬T ′(¬φ).
The purpose of ∆ is to encode the semantics of WPL into the proposi-
tional variables {p1, p2, ...}, since every WPL-formula is translated into one of
such pi, in a CPL-model satisfying ∆ the valuation of the propositional vari-
ables pi is forced to respect the semantics of WPL. For example, in WPL, if
(MWPL, v) WPL r, then it holds that (M
WPL, v) 6WPL ¬r, but the converse
direction does not hold. This is simulated in the CPL-models satisfying ∆ by
the fourth clause above: if (MCPL, v) CPL pr, then (M
CPL, v) CPL ¬p¬r
which implies that (MCPL, v) 6CPL p¬r. But, as in WPL, it does not hold that
if (MCPL, v) 6CPL p¬r, then (MCPL, v) CPL pr.
Now define the model-translation f ′ :MCPL −→MWPL:
• Let (M, v) be a CPL-model satisfying ∆. Then f ′(M, v) is defined as
follows:
– For every WPL-formula φ, f ′(M, v) WPL φ iff (M, v) CPL T ′(φ).
f ′ is also surjective (so it obeys (a) in the criterion for sub-logic above).
Then we have that
Theorem 2.4 (Mossakowski et al.).
f ′(MCPL, v) WPL φ iff (M
CPL, v) CPL ∆ and (M
CPL, v) CPL T ′(φ).
Therefore, by the above results and according to the extended definition of
sub-logic, we would have that WPL and CPL are one sub-logic of another,
which is not plausible. CPL is not a sub-logic of WPL in the sense of lan-
guage/axiomatic extension. Neither they are expressively equivalent, using (E)
above, since the “half-negation” present in WPL is not available in CPL.
The problem is that the translation fromWPL to CPL uses a trick to sneak
in the semantics of WPL into ∆. Restricting the CPL-models that satisfy ∆,
one simulates the behaviour of WPL-formulas in the propositional variables pi
and sustain such behaviour through the model-translation.
The modified version of 4gv, allowing θ to be a recursive set of sentences
looks at least as “natural” as the original one. Even considering the original
definition 2.2 we can see that there is something wrong with it, in not requiring
any kind of preservation of the structure of formulas e.g. by forcing T to be
inductively defined through the formation of formulas. Then one may conjecture
that, among more expressive logics, there be translations (T , f) where T maps
entire formulas φ to propositional variables pφ and, with a sentence θ restricting
the target structures, f is able to mimic the semantic behavior of φ. Then it is
very doubtful that the obtained pφ would have the same meaning as φ.
Thus, we think we have good reasons to consider that Garc´ıa-Matos and
Va¨a¨na¨nen’s definition of sub-logic is not adequate. It would certainly be better
to use a stronger notion of translation, paying attention to the structure of
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formulas. Only then the meaning of the target-formulas could be said to match
the meaning of the source-formulas. Below we will see that a development along
this line appeared in the literature. Nevertheless, there is still a structure-
attentive translation that “cheats” similarly as the one above, mimicking the
semantics of one logic into the other.
2.5 L. Kuijer on multi-class expressiveness
In his doctorate thesis [Kui14] Kuijer studies the expressiveness of various logics
of knowledge and action, these logics are taken in the model-theoretic sense. He
notices that there are some results relating logics similarly as in single-class
expressiveness.10 These works were selected as prototypical for a criterion in
the wider framework of multi-class expressiveness.
The purpose is to investigate features shared by all the results and construct
a criterion, to be called “expressivenessg”, based on these features. Similarly
with the work of Garc´ıa-Matos and Va¨a¨na¨nen exposed above, these prototypes
involve translations of sentences and translations of structures. So a translation
from L1 to L2 is a pair (T , f), with T : F1 → F2 and f : M1 → M2 or
f :M2 →M1, such that (T , f) satisfies some given conditions.
A first plausible condition is that (T , f) must preserve and respect truth:
Definition 2.6 (Truth preserving). A translation (T , f) : L1 → L2 with T :
F1 → F2 and f : M1 → M2 is truth preserving if, for every φ ∈ F1 and
U ∈ M1
U L1 φ if and only if f(U) L2 T (φ).
Then a tentative definition of expressivenessg could be
L2 is at least expressiveg as L1 iff there is a (T , f) : L1 → L2 that
is truth preserving.
The problem is that the requirement of truth preservation is very weak, indeed
there are several trivial truth-preserving translations among almost every logic.
Kuijer gives the following example [Kui14, p. 88].
2.6.1 A trivial translation
Let L1 = (F1,M1,L1) be any logic on possible world semantics such that F1
is countable and let L2 = (F2,M2,L2) be a logic where F2 is a countable set
of propositional variables but with no connectives and where M2 is a class of
models with possible worlds. Thus, every U′ ∈ M2 is a set of possible worlds
with a valuation.
Define a truth-preserving translation (Tt, ft) from L1 to L2 in the follow-
ing way: map every φ ∈ F1 to a propositional variable pφ ∈ F2, ft maps
a model U ∈ M1 to a model U′ ∈ M2 taking the set of possible worlds
of U and removing every other structure, and with the following valuation
10The referred results are: [Tho74a], [GH96], [GJ05], [BHT06b] and [BHT06a].
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v(pφ) = {w ∈ U | (U, w) L1 φ}. Then clearly, by definition, (Tt, ft) : L1 −→ L2
is a truth preserving translation.
2.6.2 Defining expressivenessg
Since L1 in the above example is an arbitrary logic on possible world models,
if truth preservation were the only condition for multi-class expressiveness, L2
would be at least as expressive as L1, which is absurd, given that L2 has scarce
expressive means. Nevertheless, truth-preservation is clearly a necessary condi-
tion. Thus, one must find other features P1, ..., Pn a translation must satisfy in
order to serve as a formal elucidation of the notion of multi-class expressiveness.
Another immediate criterion that comes to mind in order to avoid the trivial
translations is to require the preservation of validities and entailment relations.
However, some of the chosen prototypical translations do not preserve validity
and some do not preserve entailment. Since the idea was to capture the essential
features shared by all prototypical translations in expressivenessg, none of these
can be imposed as a necessary condition.
Kuijer then goes through a number of tentative criteria, e.g. preservation of
atomic formulas, of sub-formulas, etc., and shows that they are either too lax
or too restrictive. Among the lax criteria, that is, the ones that are satisfied by
some trivial translation, is one that Kuijer considers nonetheless important, the
criterion of being model based:
Definition 2.7 (Model based). A translation (T , f) is model based if there are
two functions f1, f2 such that, for all (M, w) ∈ M1, we have that f(M, w) =
(f1(M), f2(M, w)).
A model based translation would force f to preserve some structure ofM and
prevent that the pointed models (M, w) and (M, w′) be translated to completely
unrelated models.
Finally, the condition that apparently divides the good from bad translations
and gives a reasonable notion of multi-class expressiveness is the criterion of
being finitely generated. For the sake of simplicity, some aspects of the definition
below are not completely formalized.11 Let F be a set of formulas generated by a
set P of propositional variables and a set C of connectives. Let X = {x1, x2, ...}
be a set of variables with P∩X = ∅, and let FX be the set of formulas generated
by P ∪ {x1, x2, ...} with the connectives C. Then we have (ibid, p. 115):
Definition 2.8 (Finitely Generated). Let L1 and L2 be such that Fi is generated
by a set Pi of propositional variables and a finite set Ci of connectives, for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Let φX ∈ FX1 , then a translation (T , f) : L1 → L2 is finitely
generated if T can be inductively defined by a finite number of clauses of the
form
T (φX) = ψX for (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Ψ
11For the complete formal definition, the reader may consult [Kui14, p. 115].
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where ψX is an FX2 -sentence constructed out of x1, ..., xn and possibly containing
T (xi), for xi ∈ FX1 ; and where Ψ is the range of the xi, e.g. if a given xi is to
be replaced by a formula or only by an atomic formula.
The set X contains the special propositional variables to be used in the
translation clauses, for which one can substitute formulas. An example of such
a translation clause is: T (x1 → x2) = ¬(T (x1)∧¬T (x2)) for (x1, x2) ∈ F1×F1;
and T (x1) = x1 for x1 ∈ P .
The idea is that (ibid, p. 110) it is the fact of being inductively defined
and thus respecting (some) of the structure of the formulas that sets the finitely
generated translations apart from the trivial translations. Thus Kuijer concludes
that the truth-preserving translations giving rise to an expressiveness relation
could be characterized as the ones being finitely generated and model-based.
Therefore, the final criterion given for multi-class expressiveness is (ibid, p.
111)
Definition 2.9 (Expressivenessg). Let L1 and L2 be such that Fi is generated by
a set Pi of propositional variables and a finite set Ci of connectives for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then L2 is at least as expressiveg as L1 iff there is a translation (T , f)
from L1 to L2 that is model based, finitely generated and truth preserving.
2.9.1 A problem with expressivenessg
Kuijer had no pretensions that his multi-class definition were to be the gener-
alization of expressiveness as given by the single-class framework. The aim was
to find only a “reasonable generalization” (ibid, p. 83). While keeping this in
mind, we would like to argue that his proposal is still not good enough as a
criterion for multi-class expressiveness. This is because one can find a pair of
logics L, L′ such that L′ is intuitively more expressive than L, although L is at
least as expressiveg as L
′.
The logics at issue are Epstein’s relatedness logic (R) [Eps13, p. 80] and
classical propositional logic (CPL). The logic R besides the truth-functional
connectives, has a relevant implication “→”, which is the reason it is intuitively
more expressive than CPL, which lack such a connective. The referred transla-
tion would imply that CPL is at least as expressiveg as R.
Despite the circumscribed character of Kuijer’s criterion, we think that a
reasonable generalization of single-class expressiveness should be able to deal
with a reasonable amount of logics, not only with a handful of them. Particularly
when the logics at issue are in the literature, and have not been constructed in an
ad-hoc fashion just to give a counter-example. Finally, there is nothing specific
about the logics appearing in the counter-example, so it is quite possible that
there are also modal counter-examples.
Epstein presentsR with the connectives ¬,∧,→. The first two are defined as
usual and the underlying idea for interpreting the relevant implication symbol
“→” is as follows. It holds that p → q whenever p materially implies q and
both are subject-matter related to each other through a relation R defined on
all propositional variables. Specifically, for propositional variables pi, pj and
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R-sentences φ and ψ, R(φ, ψ) holds if and only if for some pi occurring in φ,
and pj occurring in ψ, it holds that R(pi, pj). Thus, the truth table for “→”
is the one for material implication with an additional column for R, so that if
R(φ, ψ) holds and ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ) is true, then φ → ψ is true; else, if R(φ, ψ) does
not hold, then φ→ ψ is false.
Let τ = {p0, p1, ...,¬,→,∧} be a signature for R. An R-model (M,R, v)
is formed by the truth-tables for ∧,¬,→, a symmetric and reflexive relation
R on τ -formulas and a valuation v. For propositional variables di,j , let τ
+ =
{p1, p2, ...} ∪ {di,j | i, j ∈ N} ∪ {¬,∧,⊃}. Let CPL be defined on τ+ (note we
use ⊃ here to emphasize that it is a material implication).12
We will see below that there is a truth-preserving, model-based and finitely
generated translation (T E , fE) : R −→ CPL. The mapping T E is defined as
follows:13
• T E(φ→ ψ) = (T E(φ) ⊃ T E(ψ)) ∧ dφ,ψ
• literal for ¬,∧ and atomic formulas.14
Here the basic idea for the translation of φ→ ψ comes from the definition of
“→”: φ materially implies ψ and both formulas are related through R. As the
translation is defined inductively through the formation of formulas by a finite
number of clauses, it is finitely generated.
Now, from an R-model (M,R, v), one easily defines a transformation fE
from R-models to CPL-models. Let fE(M,R, v) = (M∗, v∗), where, for M∗
take all the truth-tables in M, excluding the one for →. Define v∗ as follows
(adapted from [Eps13, p. 300]):
• v∗(pi) = v(pi);
• v∗(dφ,ψ) = T iff R(φ, ψ) holds.
Clearly fE is model-based.
Both CPL and R satisfy a semantic deduction theorem (ibid, p. 299). To
prove that (T E , fE) is truth-preserving, one has to prove only that, for an
arbitrary R-model (M,R, v), it holds that
12The use of new propositional variables is for the sake of simplicity, as we could arrange
the p1, p2, ... in CPL so as to assign some of the pis the role of such di,j .
13The mapping presented was adapted from (ibid, p. 299). It was given a simpler form
which makes the proof of the theorem below straightforward. We refer to Epstein’s mapping
as T E
∗
, which is identical with T E except for →, where
T E
∗
(φ→ ψ) =
(T E
∗
(φ) ⊃ T E
∗
(ψ)) ∧ [(
∨
pi in φ, pj in ψ
di,j) ∨ (
∨
pn in φ, pn in ψ
(dn,n ∨ ¬dn,n))].
Notice that our mapping T E below is only truth-preserving while Epstein’s T E
∗
is also
validity-preserving, as e.g. T E(p → p) = (p ⊃ p) ∧ dp,p and T E
∗
(p → p) = (p ⊃ p) ∧ [dp,p ∨
(dp,p ∨ ¬dp,p)].
14Kuijer requires also that no propositional variable occurs outside the scope of a translation
function, so for atomic formulas one should use additional functions s : P −→ P. Thus we
can take the identity function as such s.
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Theorem 2.10 (adapted from Epstein).
(M,R, v) R φ if and only if f
E(M,R, v) CPL T E(φ).
Corollary 2.11. CPL is at least as expressiveg as R.
The main question now is: does (T E , fE) : R −→ CPL show that CPL is at
least as expressive as R? We do not think it is reasonable to say so, since the
extra expressiveness brought about by the implication connective in R is only
by a trick mimicked in CPL. Independently of the model-translation fE to give
the intended truth values for the “relevance-mimicking” variables dφ,ψ, it is not
possible to have a relevant conditional in CPL, by say, adjoining to a conditional
φ ⊃ ψ such variables dφ,ψ. To do so, would require too much for the intended
meaning of such variables. Surely this would not augment the expressive power
of the propositional logic, as it concerns only an interpretation of propositional
variables, and intuitively, specific interpretations of propositional variables do
not influence the expressiveness of a logic.
Anyway, the model-mappings are not essential for these translations using
indexed variables, they only facilitate their definition. An early example was
given by Richard Statman in [Sta79] where a translation of IPL into its implica-
tional fragment IPL↾{→} is presented. There, the conjunctions p∧q are mapped
to implications containing xp∧q, among formulas of the sort xp → (xq → xp∧q),
xp∧q → xp, etc. Here the situation is entirely different since the proof-theoretic
behaviour of individual conjunctions are encoded in specific variables using im-
plicational axioms.
Coming back to Kuijer’s criterion, we argued above that it is not enough to
give an intuitively adequate account of expressiveness. If the model mapping
were not from the source logic to the target logic but vice-versa, then there
would not be such truth preserving mappings from R to CPL, as there would
be no way to construct the relatedness predicate R out of a CPL-model. Kui-
jer discarded such a definition of the model mappings f since it implies that
any truth-preserving translation is also validity preserving,15 and some of his
paradigmatic examples of multi-class expressiveness are not validity preserving.
Let us analyse a possible strengthening on the formula translation. We will
not give a detailed analysis of features of translations since it suffices to notice
that Epstein’s translation preserves completely the structure of the formulas,
except for →. For this case, additional propositional variables dφ,ψ must be
introduced to bear the intended meaning of R (variables whose interpretation
in CPL is sustained by the model translation.) If one required that T be com-
positional, that is, every n-ary connective C(φ1, ..., φn) of the source logic is
translated by a schema CT (T (φ1)/ξ1, ..., T (φn)/ξn) of the target logic, then the
above translation would not pass the test. This is because p1 → p2 is trans-
lated through the schema ¬(ξ1 ∧ ¬ξ2) ∧ dp1,p2 , and p3 → p4 by the schema
15Suppose that for logics L = (F ,M, L) and L
′ = (F ′,M′ L′) that (T , f) : L −→ L
′ is
truth-preserving, with T : F −→ F ′ and f : M′ −→ M. Suppose φ is L-valid, then for any
model U′ ∈M′, f(U′) L φ, thus, by truth-preservation, U
′ L′ T (φ), but U
′ is any L′-model,
thus, T (φ) is L′-valid.
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¬(ξ1 ∧ ¬ξ2) ∧ dp3,p4 . If the translation were compositional, dealing with the
same connective, the same translation schema would be used.
The problem of adopting this criterion is that it implies that the connectives
be translated one at a time, and again some of the paradigmatic translations
selected by Kuijer takes into consideration sequences of connectives, so they
would not satisfy it.
Therefore, to prevent translations such as those above from passing the
test for multi-class, one would have to use a criterion for T that is stronger
than being finitely generated, but weaker than being compositional. Neverthe-
less, the enterprise of placing restrictions on the formula translations T alone
seems not to be promising, as the model-translations play a major role in the
counter-examples presented above. On the other hand, placing also restrictions
on model-translations and making them fit with the restrictions on formula-
translations is a very complex enterprise, and there may be better alternatives.
Given this situation, we would like to suggest a change of perspective as
regards relative expressiveness between logics. Below, some comments will be
made regarding the nature of the notion of expressiveness and its relation with
the concept of logical system it applies to.
2.12 Single-class expressiveness vs multi-class expressive-
ness vs translational expressiveness
Now we would like to make some remarks on the study of the relation of ex-
pressiveness between logics. As we commented before, in the single-class frame-
work it is very simple to define relative expressiveness, since there is a common
ground, the structures, where one can compare whether the sentences have the
same meaning. Now consider the multi-class framework, if L = (F ,M,) and
L′ = (F ′,M′,′) are defined on different classes of structures, how would we
know whether an L-sentence φ and an L′-sentence ψ have the same meaning?
After all, in this case it trivially holds that ModL(φ) 6=ModL′(ψ).
As we saw, for this task new tools are needed: a model-mapping f :M−→
M′ or f ′ :M′ −→M;16 and a formula-mapping T : F −→ F ′ or T ′ : F ′ −→ F .
Now, for an L-formula φ and L′-formula ψ, we would have some possibilities for
guessing when φ and ψ have the same meaning:
• ModL(φ) =ModL(T ′(ψ)),
• ModL′(ψ) =ModL′(T (φ)),
• f [ModL(φ)] =ModL′(ψ),17
• f ′[ModL′(ψ)] =ModL(φ).
Thus, now the weight goes on the notion of translation (T , f). As we saw
in the examples presented above, for (U, φ) in L, and (U′, ψ) in L′, the task of
establishing the congruence between the pairs (U, φ) and (U′, ψ) by means of
translations is very difficult. Basing it on satisfaction is far away from being
16The translation f presupposes a mapping σ of signatures: for each L[τ ]-structure, there
would correspond a L′[σ(τ)]-structure, respectively for f ′.
17Let f [ModL(φ)] = {f(U) | U ∈ModL(φ)}.
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sufficient, since we can easily devise translation functions such that U satisfies
φ iff U′ satisfies ψ.
On the other hand, imposing conditions on (T , f) is a complex enterprise,
because either it under-generates or, by a little breach, it over-generates. More-
over, the need to have model-mappings besides formula-mappings may open up
a back door to undesirable translations, to see it, consider again the examples of-
fered against Garc´ıa-Matos & Va¨a¨na¨nen’s and Kuijer’s approaches. All of them
use some “trick” in the formula-translation function and sustain it through the
model-translation. Then it is of little help to place structural restrictions on
formula-translations, as did Kuijer. He also tried placing restrictions on model-
translations, but it did not help either.
Therefore, it might be more promising to move to a wider framework of
relative expressiveness, dispensing with the semantic notions altogether. In
this framework, to be called “translational expressiveness”, we would then con-
centrate the investigations on the conditions on formula translations. The
aim is to find the set of conditions that better preserve/respect the theorem-
hood/consequence relation and the structure of formulas of each logic. This way
a reasonable formal criterion of expressiveness for Tarskian and proof-theoretic
logics (TPL, for short) would be obtained, and a bigger range of logics would
be comparable. Finally, these advantages would arguably come at no cost, since
this wider enterprise would not be more difficult than multi-class expressiveness.
The big difference between the approaches of expressiveness is not in the
division between expressiveness for model-theoretic logics and for TPL, but in
the division, in model-theoretic logics, of expressiveness within the same and
within different classes of structures. Naturally the most direct concepts of
expressiveness are linked with the capacity of characterizing structures, but this
only applies when comparing the same class of structures.
If one allows translations between structures, such capacity is no longer at
issue. Once we depart from the safe harbour of a single class of structures
for comparing logics, then all bets are off. Multi-class expressiveness does not
guarantee a firmer grasp of the intuitive concept of expressiveness anymore than
translational expressiveness. Since the move to a wider framework might not
only free us from problems inherent to multi-class expressiveness, but also allow
a bigger range of comparison of logics, then the prospects for the enterprise are
better.
As we said in the introduction, people have been using informally some con-
cepts of translational expressiveness between logics. However, as opposed to
what happens with model-theoretic logics, to the best of our knowledge, in the
literature there is only one explicit and formal criterion in this framework, that
of [MDT09]. In the next section, their proposal will be analysed and we will
show that it is not adequate. We shall then propose some adequacy criteria for
expressiveness and a formal criterion in the framework of translational expres-
siveness will be given. We then argue that the criterion satisfies the adequacy
criteria.
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3 Translational expressiveness: obtaining a still
wider notion of expressiveness
In this section we will deal with logics in the Tarskian and proof-theoretic sense.
We also mention logics taken as a closed set of theorems/validities, to be called
simply “formula logics”. Let L1 and L2 be logics, Γ∪{φ} be a set of L1-formulas
and T a translation mapping L1-formulas into L2-formulas in such a way that
for each L1-formula φ:
⊢L1 φ if and only if ⊢L2 T (φ).
In this case L1 is translatable into L2 with respect to theoremhood.
If it is the case that
Γ ⊢L1 φ if and only if T (Γ) ⊢L2 T (φ)
then L1 is translatable into L2 with respect to derivability [PM68, p. 216]. The
later translations are known as conservative translations [FD01].
Definition 3.1 (Conservative translation). A conservative translation is a trans-
lation with respect to derivability.
Whenever we want to refer indistinctly to translations with respect to theo-
remhood or conservative translations, the term back-and-forth will be employed.
Definition 3.2 (Back-and-forth translation). A translation is back-and-forth if
it is either a theoremhood preserving or a conservative translation.
3.3 Mossakowski et. al.’s approach
As far as we know, Mossakowski et al. [MDT09] proposed the first explicit
criterion for the concept of sub-logic and expressiveness in the framework of
translational expressiveness:
Definition 3.4 (Sub-logic). L1 is a sub-logic of L2 if and only if there is an
injective conservative translation from L1 to L2;
Definition 3.5 (Expressiveness). L1 is at most as expressive as L2 iff there is
a conservative translation α : L1 −→ L2.
The authors do not explain why sub-logic requires injective conservative
mappings while expressiveness does not. Anyway, we will see that these criteria
for sub-logic and expressiveness via conservative mappings do not work.
The conception that conservative translations could give rise to a notion of
expressiveness and also a notion of logic inclusion has been supported more than
once. For example, in [Con05, p. 233] it is said that the existence of a conser-
vative translation (maybe injective or bijective) would give rise to some kind of
3.3 Mossakowski et. al.’s approach 18
logic inclusion between Tarskian logics.18 Also for Kuijer, conservative transla-
tions give an adequate concept of expressiveness for Tarskian logics [Kui14, p.
86].19
Unfortunately, conservative translations will not make a reasonable concept
neither of sub-logic nor of expressiveness. Due to a result of Jerˇa´bek [Jerˇ12],
explaining expressiveness and sub-logic through conservative translations would
make CPL include and be at least as expressive as many familiar logical systems,
e.g. first-order logic. He proved the following result (ibid, p. 668), where for a
logic L, a translation is most general whenever it is equivalent to a substitution
instance of every other translation of L to CPL.
Theorem 3.6 (Jerˇa´bek). For every finitary deductive system L = (F ,⊢) over a
countable set of formulas F , there exists a conservative most general translation
T : L → CPL. If ⊢ is decidable, then f is computable.
The defined mapping is injective.20 Let a logic be called “reasonable” if it is
a countable finitary Tarskian logic. Jerˇa´bek managed to generalize even more
his results so that almost any reasonable logic can be conservatively translated
into the usual logics dealt with in the literature.21 Now one would hardly accept
that every countable finitary logic has the same expressiveness or is one sub-logic
of the other.
The author criticizes the notion of conservative translation for not requiring
the preservation of neither the structure of the formulas nor the properties of
the source logic [Jerˇ12, p. 666]. Thus, it must be strengthened in order to
serve for an expressiveness measure. This could be done in a simpler way by
requiring injective, surjective or bijective mappings. As Jerˇa´bek’s mapping is
injective, only requiring injectiveness will not do. As a matter of fact, it seems
that already requiring injectiveness one is overshooting the mark. Since in
this way CPL↾{∧,¬} would not be as expressive as CPL↾{∧,¬,∨}. Any mapping
g : CPL↾{∧,¬,∨} −→ CPL↾{∧,¬} would have to map both CPL↾{∧,¬,∨}-sentences
φ∨ ψ and ¬(¬φ ∧¬ψ) to the same CPL↾{∧,¬}-sentence ¬(¬g(φ) ∧¬g(ψ)), so it
would not be injective.
Other kinds of strengthening hinted by Jerˇa´bek’s (ibid) are:
18The author says (ibid):
If we assume (...) a Tarskian perspective, then a logic system is nothing
more than a set of formulas together with a [consequence] relation (...) Thus,
the preservation of that relation by a conservative translation [from L1 to L2]
would reveal that, as structures, L2 “contains” L1 (Probably we should add the
requirement that f is an injective or even a bijective mapping.)
19The author says (ibid):
There is a conservative translation from L1 to L2 if and only if everything
that can be said in L1 can also be said in L2.
20For the sake of brevity, we omit the definition of the translation and simply point out
that it is a non-general-recursive translation (to be defined below).
21Among others, classical, intuitionistic, minimal and intermediate logics, modal logics (clas-
sical or intuitionistic), substructural logics, first-order (or higher-order) extensions of the for-
mer logics.
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1. force the mappings to preserve more structure of the source logic sentences
in the target logic;
2. force the mappings to preserve more properties of the source logic.
The adequacy criteria for expressiveness to be given below will require to
some extent (1) and (2).
3.7 Adequacy criteria for expressiveness
As we saw above, Mossakowski et al. [MDT09] gave a proposal for a wide notion
of expressiveness: by means of the existence of conservative translations. Due
to Jerˇa´bek’s results on the ubiquity on this kind of translation, their definition
is not adequate. Maybe we should step back and think about some adequacy
criteria every approach to expressiveness ought to accomplish.
The intuitive explanation for expressiveness (E) given in the beginning elu-
cidates relative expressiveness in terms of a certain congruence of meanings. It
appears already in a more direct form in Wo´jcicki’s Theory of Logical Calculi
[Wo´j88, p. 67], and we place it as the first adequacy criterion
[Adequacy Criterion 1] L2 is at least as expressive as L1 only if
everything that can be said in terms of the connectives of L1 can
also be said in terms of the connectives of L2.
Here, for “being said in terms of the connectives” there can be stricter inter-
pretations (as proposed by Wo´jcicki, Humberstone, Epstein) and wider inter-
pretations (as proposed by Mossakowski et al. and us), to be developed below.
There are some meta-properties of logics that are intuitively known to limit
or increase expressiveness. Thus, the presence/absence of such properties can be
used to test whether there can be or not an expressiveness relation between the
given logics. A first one coming to mind is that nothing can be expressed in a
trivial logic, so it cannot be more expressive than any logic. Another one has to
do with the relation between expressiveness and computational complexity. This
relation has even been stated as the “Golden Rule of Logic” by van Benthem
in [vB06, p. 119], where he says “gains in expressive power are lost in higher
complexity”. Nevertheless, the “Golden Rule” is not quite useful here, since we
know that in general neither a low expressiveness means low complexity,22 nor
a high complexity means high expressiveness.23
Nevertheless the complexity levels of decidability/undecidability can be use-
ful for expressiveness comparisons: if a logic is decidable, then it cannot describe
Turing machines, Post’s normal systems, or semi-Thue systems. Therefore, a
decidable logic L cannot be more expressive than an undecidable logic L′, oth-
erwise, L would not be decidable!
22For example, there are propositional logics whose complexity is in each arbitrary degree
of unsolvability (e.g. see [Gla69]).
23There can be equally expressive logics that, though both decidable, have very different
computational complexities (e.g. see [LB87]).
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The third meta-property that could be useful when evaluating expressiveness
relations (except, naturally, when dealing with formula-logics) is the deduction
theorem. Though involved in many formulation issues, as we shall see, a logic
has a deduction theorem when it has the capacity to express in the object lan-
guage its deductibility relation. Thus, other things being equal, a logic having
this capability is intuitively more expressive than another one lacking it. There-
fore, it is desirable that an expressiveness relation carries with it the deduction
theorem, so that (a) below apparently should hold
(a)
if L2 is more expressive than L1, and L1 has a deduction
theorem, then so does L2.
We have some issues here. Being formulation sensitive, it is complicated to
define in which circumstances the existence of a deduction theorem for a logic
implies its existence in another logic, whenever there is an expressiveness relation
between them. For example, a less expressive logic might have the standard
deduction theorem,24 while the more expressive logic has only a general version
of it, or perhaps lacks it completely. This happens with Mendelson’s FOL,25
the propositional fragment of it still satisfies the standard deduction theorem,
though it fails for quantified formulas. So, it does not seem reasonable to say
that this formulation of FOL is not more expressive than CPL, because it
does not satisfy the standard deduction theorem, since the fragment of FOL as
expressive as CPL satisfies it.26
Cases like these constrain us to limit the role of the deduction theorem in
expressiveness relations, admitting wider formulations of it. Thus we are forced
to adapt (a) accordingly so as to be able to take into account such phenomena.
Finally, we have the meta-property related adequacy criterion.
[Adequacy Criterion 2] It cannot hold that L2 be more expressive
than L1 when
• L1 is non trivial and L2 is trivial;
• L1 is undecidable and L2 is decidable;
• L1 satisfies the standard deduction theorem and the language
fragment of L2 purportedly as expressive as L1 does not satisfy
(not even) the general deduction theorem;
The last criterion reflects the intuition that expressiveness is a transitive
relation and there are logics that are more expressive than others.
[Adequacy Criterion 3] (Taken from [Kui14]) The expressiveness
relation should be a non-trivial pre-order, that is, it should be a
transitive and reflexive relation, and there must be some pair of
logics L1 and L2 such that L2 is not at least as expressive as L1.
We now analyse with greater detail the criteria 1 and 2.
24To be defined below.
25A Hilbert-style first-order calculus with the generalization rule “from φ infer ∀xφ”. For
more, see [Men97, p. 76].
26The same considerations apply to LTK
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3.7.1 Criterion 1- on “whatever can be said in terms of the connec-
tives”
We can understand this criterion as saying “every connective of L1 is definable in
L2”. But the usual notion of definability is either treated within the same logic,
or between different logics within the same class of structures. As we intend
to deal with translations between logics, the usual notion of definability is too
rigid. We must give a broader reading of the criterion 1 in order to understand
it as imposing an intuitive restriction on translations between logics. Thus the
idea is to impose restrictions P1, P2, ... on translations so that
T : L1 −→ L2 satisfies P1, P2, ... only if, intuitively, everything that
can be said in terms of the connectives of L1 can also be said in
terms of the connectives of L2; let us say in shorter terms that this
happens only if the connectives of L1 are generally preserved in L2.
In the sequence some candidates for such P1, P2, ... are listed, the back-and-
forth condition was given before.
Definition 3.8 (Compositional). A translation T : L1 −→ L2 is compositional
whenever for every n-ary connective # of L1 there is an L2-formula ψ# such
that T (#(φ1, ..., φn)) = ψ#(T (φ1), ..., T (φn)).
Definition 3.9 (Grammatical). A grammatical translation T is a back-and-
forth compositional translation such that, for a sentence φ, T (φ) may contain
no other formulas other than the ones appearing in T (p), where p appears in φ
(thus, no parameters are allowed).
Definition 3.10 (Definitional). A definitional translation T is a grammatical
translation for which T (p) = p for every atomic p.
We have four proposals for filling the above list of restrictions. All of them
require basically two conditions, taking as P1 the back-and-forth condition. In
decreasing order of strictness, there is divergence in taking P2 as a
1. definitional translation (Wo´jcicki and Humberstone),
2. grammatical translation (Epstein and apparently Koslow),
3. general-recursive translation (to be defined below),
4. surjective conservative translation (Mossakowski et al.).
Humberstone [Hum05], recalling Wo´jciki’s definitional translations and in-
tuitions about expressiveness, guessed that if there is a definitional translation
between L1 and L2, then all connectives in L1 are preserved in L2.27 For us, the
existence of a definitional translation from L1 to L2 is the strongest guarantee
that the connectives of L1 are generally preserved in L2. Nevertheless, it is too
strict a requirement, and there are weaker forms of translations that can also
do the job.
27However, it seems that in [Hum05, p. 147] he allows that connectives are preserved in a
weaker way, through compositional translations.
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For Epstein [Eps13, p. 302], a grammatical translation is a homomorphism
between languages and thus it yields a translation of the connectives. The
justification is that such translations are only possible when for each connective
in the source logic, there corresponds a specific structure in the target logic that
behaves similarly. Thus, through a grammatical translation, the connectives of
the source logic are generally preserved in the target logic. Koslow [Kos15, p.
48] also allows that a connective from one logic L1 “persists” in L2 if there is a
homomorphism from L1 to L2.
According to Mossakowski et al. [MDT09], grammatical translations are
too demanding for the task, as many useful and important translations are non-
grammatical (e.g. the standard modal translation). For them, instead of seeking
to preserve the structure of the formulas, it would be better to preserve the
proof-theoretic behaviour of the connectives and to treat the connectives only
as regards this behaviour (ibid, p. 100). In this paper, some proof-theoretic
conditions on the connectives are listed, e.g. for conjuntction the condition is
Γ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ iff Γ ⊢ φ and Γ ⊢ ψ. This formulation may lead one to think that
∧ here shall be a logical constant, and not possibly a formula γ(φ, ψ) (think of
CPL↾{¬,∨}, where γ(φ, ψ) = ¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ)); naturally in the first case, the whole
proposal would make no sense. In table 1 we reformulate the conditions to
reflect their proposal more clearly, where δ# is an arbitrary formula that stands
for the connective #.
falsum δ⊥(ξ) ⊢ φ, for every φ
conjunction Γ ⊢ δ∧(φ, ψ) iff Γ ⊢ φ and Γ ⊢ ψ
disjunction δ∨(φ, ψ),Γ ⊢ χ iff φ,Γ ⊢ χ and ψ,Γ ⊢ χ
implication Γ ⊢ δ→(φ, ψ) iff Γ, φ ⊢ ψ
negation Γ, φ ⊢ δ⊥(ξ) iff Γ ⊢ δ¬(φ).
Table 1: Reformulation of proof theoretic connectives as given by Mossakowski
et al.
Definition 3.11 (presence of a proof-theoretic connective). A proof-theoretic
connective is present in a logic if it is possible to define the corresponding oper-
ations on sentences satisfying the conditions given in table 1.
We shall now investigate this idea in detail and argue that, as it is, the
preservation of connectives would require mappings stricter than conservative
translations otherwise the notion of the “presence” of a connective must be
relaxed.
Drawbacks on the preservation of proof-theoretic connectives A trans-
lation T : L1 −→ L2 transports a given L1-connective # if its presence in L1
implies its presence in L2, the converse implication is called reflection [MDT09,
p. 100]. It is claimed (ibid) that if a mapping T : L1 −→ L2 is conservative
and surjective, then all proof theoretic connectives of L1 are transported to L2
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and all proof-theoretic connectives present in L2 are reflected in L1. However,
this claim must be taken with a grain of salt, let us see why.
Let L1 be a logic having a proof-theoretic conjunction according with the
table 1 above and suppose there is a surjective conservative mapping T : L1 −→
L2. For L2-formulas δ1, δ2, let Γ∪{φ, ψ} be a set of L1-formulas with T (φ) = δ1
and T (ψ) = δ2. Then it holds that
(T (Γ) ⊢L2 T (φ) and T (Γ) ⊢L2 T (ψ)) iff Γ ⊢L1 δ
∧(φ, ψ) iff
T (Γ) ⊢L2 T (δ
∧(φ, ψ)).
Thus, L2 would have proof-theoretic conjunction. The grain of salt is that,
once no structural restriction is imposed upon T , it is not necessary that
T (δ∧(φ, ψ)) be constructed out of T (φ) and T (ψ). In this case, it seems at
least unnatural to say that T (δ∧(φ, ψ)) is an operation on the sentences T (φ)
and T (ψ).
Therefore, we must relax what it means for a connective to be present in a
logic. One has to say that e.g. the proof-theoretic conjunction is present in a
logic L2 if, for all formulas δ1, δ2 and set of formulas ∆, there is a formula γ
such that (∆ ⊢L2 δ1 and ∆ ⊢L2 δ2) iff ∆ ⊢L2 γ. A similar reformulation should
be given for the other connectives. In this case, though, whenever it holds that
∆ ⊢L2 δ1 and ∆ ⊢L2 δ2, then any L2-theorem in the place of γ serves to satisfy
this condition for conjunction.
For example, take a Tarskian logic L defined on the signature {p, q, r,⊤},
where p, q, r are propositional variables and ⊤ the constant for logical truth.
Then L has proof-theoretic conjunction since p, q ⊢ p and p, q ⊢ q holds iff
p, q ⊢ ⊤. This is probably unproblematic and a consequence of the meaning of
⊤. Nevertheless, for some cases this approach to the presence of connectives
has some downsides. For example, restrict L to the signature {p,⊤}. Then L
has the proof-theoretic conditional, since it holds that
p ⊢ p iff ⊢ ⊤, ⊤ ⊢ p iff ⊢ p, p ⊢ ⊤ iff ⊢ ⊤ and ⊤ ⊢ ⊤ iff ⊢ ⊤.
But if the signature were incremented by another variable q, then the resulting
system would no longer have a proof-theoretic conditional, since for no δ it
would hold that p ⊢ q iff ⊢ δ. This volatility of the presence of proof-theoretic
connectives is unreasonable.
Recapitulating, the idea of this approach is that one shall define the map-
pings so as to preserve the proof-theoretic connectives, instead of requiring the
mappings themselves to preserve the structure of the formulas. But if the map-
pings do not respect the structure of the formulas, what shall be called the
presence of a connective, must also be relaxed.
Besides the inconvenients mentioned above, this proposal would be too re-
strictive in some cases. For example, Statman’s translation [Sta79] of IPL into
its implicational fragment shows how can one “express” (in some sense of the
term) conjunctions using only implicational formulas; recent works have general-
ized this result so that any logic having a certain natural deduction formulation
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and having the sub-formula principle is translatable into the implicational frag-
ment of minimal logic [Hae15].28 Nevertheless, not even in the weaker sense
given above the conjunctions are “present” in IPL↾{→}.
Anyway, it must be borne in mind that to give a good and general def-
inition of when a connective or operator is generally preserved is a difficult
and spinous topic. Below we give another proposal, which is at the same time
weaker (the translation mentioned above would enter) and stronger (requires
structure-attentive mappings).
Let us now consider the structure-attentive translations and think on the
minimum conditions on the preservation of the structure of formulas that would
allow for a reasonable and general notion of preservation of connectives.
General-recursive translations: allowing context-sensitivity in a gen-
eral preservation of connectives The criterion of compositionality given
above a priori seems a reasonable condition for the preservation of connectives
through translations. Notice that in the criterion the function T that translates
#(φ1, ..., φn) is the same that translates the sub-formulas φi. From this comes
the compositionality: a translation T of a formula is obtained through the same
translation T of its sub-formulas.
Thinking about the issue of translating a connective, it is also reasonable that
the translation be sensitive to the context where the connective is inserted. This
is the case in the translation (T+) : Grz −→ S4 in [DG00], where T+(¬p) =
¬p, but T+(p) = ((p → p) → p). Therefore, T+ distinguishes between
translating -formula and ¬-formula, and this is done through the help of an
auxiliary translation (see complete definition in section 3.27). Thus, there are
translations between some logics where the mappings must be context-sensitive,
so as to convey the proper meaning of some source connectives in the target logic.
There are also those cases where the connectives can be dealt context-
-independently but auxiliary translations are needed anyway. The standard
translation of modal logic to FOL, besides some parameters, needs n auxil-
iary translations for each formula of modal degree n e.g. as T x(p) = Px but
T x(φ) = ∀y(Rxy → T y(φ)).
For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict our notion of context-sensitivity
to whether or not the connective to be translated is in the scope of an unary
operator. When the translation of a n-ary connective # is sensitive as to whether
it is on the scope of an unary ◦, a simple solution is to treat ◦# as a composite
n-ary connective to be translated. With the aim of capturing these cases, let us
consider a sufficiently general kind of translation.
French in [Fre10] presents a concept of recursively interdependent translation
that includes non-compositional translations that are still defined recursively
through the formation of formulas. A generalization of his concept will be
employed here, since the original has an unmotivated restriction allowing only
28The idea of these translations is the following: for a given IPL-formula φ, take all sub-
formulas δ1, δ2 and associate to it implicational axioms of the sort xδ1∧δ2 → xδ1 , xδ1∧δ2 → xδ2
and xδ1 → (xδ2 → xδ1∧δ2 ), where xδ1 , xδ2 and xδ1∧δ2 are fresh variables.
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unary auxiliary mappings. The generalization allows auxiliary mappings of any
arity and also has a simpler notation. Let L1 = (F1,⊢L1) and L2 = (F2,⊢L2)
be logics,
Definition 3.12 (General-Recursive). Let T ′1 , ..., T
′
w be auxiliary mappings of
any arity defined inductively on F1-formulas. A translation T : F1 −→ F2 from
L1 to L2 is general-recursive if, for every n-ary connective # and formulas
φ1, ..., φn ∈ F1, there is an L2-formula #T (p1, ..., pm) containing only the
shown propositional variables p1, ..., pm, such that
T (#(φ1, ..., φn)) = #T (T ′1 (φi, ..., φj)/p1, ..., T
′
w(φh, ..., φl)/pm)
where {φi, ..., φj} ∪ {φh, ..., φl} ⊆ {φ1, ..., φn}.
Notice that the clauses must be given for each single connective in the source
logic. If there is a need to translate a composite connective, an additional clause
for it should be given.
Therefore, the general-recursive translations are still structure-preserving
and must be defined inductively through the formation of formulas. Later in sec-
tion 3.19.1 we argue that, together with some other conditions, general-recursive
translations preserve, in a general but reasonable sense of the term, the connec-
tives of the source in the target logic.
Another issue with translated connectives One might insist whether the
behaviour of the defined connective in the target logic would indeed be equiva-
lent with the behavior of the original connective. Corcoran argues that this is
often not the case. In [Cor69, p. 172] he defines a notion of “deductive strength”
which is based on the capacity of a logic to introduce and eliminate a connective
occurring as a principal sign in a formula.
Considering this notion, it can be that a given connective # of a logic L1
be definable in a logic L2 through a translation, nevertheless, the “deductive
strength” of L2 as regards # is lower than the corresponding one in L1. For ex-
ample, consider the two classical propositional logics CPL↾{¬,→} and CPL↾{¬,∧},
formulated as natural deduction systems. Translating the conditional from
CPL↾{¬,→} to CPL↾{¬,∧} one obtains the following rule of inference: from the
pattern of reasoning from φ to ψ, infer ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ). Contrary to the rule for →
in L1 (the usual natural deduction rule), according to Corcoran this rule of L2
is not rigorous, since it depends on the rules of the other connectives.
Corcoran’s considerations are very interesting, but we think that despite the
fact that the defined connectives can lose “deductive strength” (in his terms) it is
reasonable to say that they maintain expressive strength. The loss of “deductive
strength” can influence other issues such as modularity, normalization, etc. but
it does not affect directly expressiveness.
Having revised the literature linked with the adequacy criterion 1 and stated
our proposal, now the same will be done with respect to the adequacy criterion
2.
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3.12.1 Criterion 2- On the preservation of (some) meta-properties
There are two important issues here:
(i) what is being understood as a meta-property
(ii) what does it mean for a translation to preserve a meta-property of one
logic into another
It would seem desirable to have a general formal framework so that one could
give precise answers to (i) and (ii). Nevertheless, the adequacy criterion 2 asks
for preservation of specific meta-properties, and not of every meta-property of
a certain kind. Thus, there is no need to place them in a fixed framework.
Moreover the first two (non-triviality and decidability) have simple and exact
formulations, so it is straightforward to stablish whether they are preserved by
a translation.
The only meta-property whose statement and definition of preservation need
elucidation is the deduction theorem. As the framework(s) of (hyper) contextual
translations29 offers exact answers to (i) and (ii) above, we will investigate
whether they are adequate for our purposes. In both, a logic is taken as an
assertion calculus containing a set of formulas and a set of rules of inference
between sequents. The difference between the frameworks is the kind of sequent
allowed. The language of the assertion calculus includes schematic variables
for sentences ξ1, ξ2, ... and set of sentences X1, X2, ..., so the calculus has also
substitution and instantiation rules for dealing with those.
In these frameworks, P is a meta-property of a logic L defined in the above
terms whenever P can be formulated as an inference between sequents (or hyper-
sequents), that is, if P can be formulated as a derived rule of L. For example, the
deduction theorem can be formulated this way: from Γ, φ ⊢ ψ, infer Γ ⊢ φ→ ψ.
Now for the disjunctive property, one needs the richer framework of the hyper-
sequents: from Γ ⊢ φ ∨ ψ, infer Γ ⊢ φ or infer Γ ⊢ ψ.
A (hyper) contextual translation T : L1 −→ L2 is a mapping that is trans-
parent to the schematic variables such that if P is a meta-property of L1 then,
T (P ) is a meta-property of L2. The transparency to schematic variables implies
that (hyper) contextual translations by definition preserve structural properties
such as left weakening: from X ⊢ ξ, infer X,X ′ ⊢ ξ.
Consider now the finiteness property, i.e. if Γ ⊢ φ, then for a finite ∆ ⊆ Γ,
∆ ⊢ φ. It cannot be formulated in neither of the cited frameworks, indeed
the same holds for the majority of other relevant meta-properties of logics:
decidability, interpolation, cut-elimination, etc.
Despite the limitation on expressible meta-properties, the framework of (hy-
per) contextual translations has also a clear answer to item (ii) above: a trans-
lation T preserves a meta-property P of the source logic if T (P ) is a derived
rule of the target logic.
29See [CCD09], [CF15] and [Mor16] for a detailed presentation of both.
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In the sequence we use the example of the deduction theorem to argue that
there can be some problems even with this strict notion of meta-property preser-
vation.
A limitation of the formulation of meta-property in the framework of
(hyper) contextual translations Even in the strict framework of (hyper)
contextual translations, meta-properties are formulation-sensitive, so that one
formulation of a meta-property P may hold for a logic L while other formu-
lation P ′ fails for L. A paradigmatic example is the deduction theorem. In
most formulations, e.g. for classical propositional logic (CPL) and intuitionistic
propositional logic (IPL), it is read as: If Γ, φ ⊢ ψ, then Γ ⊢ φ → ψ. Never-
theless, only a generalized version holds for Lukasiewicz L3: If Γ, φ ⊢ ψ, then
Γ ⊢ φ→ (φ→ ψ) [Pog64].
A similar issue occurs in systems containing proof-rules besides inference-
rules,30 for example, Mendelson’s FOL and modal logic with the necessitation
rule. In both cases, only a modified version of the deduction theorem holds. For
modal logic K, among other possibilities, the following deduction theorem holds
[Zem67, p. 58]: if Γ, φ ⊢K ψ, and each of the propositional variables appearing
in hypothesis Γ ∪ {φ} is in the scope of a modal operator, then Γ ⊢K φ→ ψ.31
For Mendelson’s system, the formulation of the deduction theorem is also
clumsy [Men97, p. 80]: “Assume that, in some deduction showing that Γ, φ ⊢ ψ,
no application of [the generalization rule] to a wff that depends upon φ has as
its quantified variable a free variable of φ. Then, Γ ⊢ φ→ ψ.”
So what is a deduction theorem? According to Zeman, the general statement
of it might be [Zem67, p. 56]
Definition 3.13 (DT). If there is a proof from the hypotheses φ1, ..., φn for the
formula ψ, then there is a proof from the hypotheses φ1, ..., φn−1 for the formula
φn ⊃ ψ.
For Zeman, the problem of the formulation of the deduction theorem for
each system lies in the proper understanding in the system of what it is meant
by a “proof from hypotheses”. Thus, the different results cited above for L3,
modal logic and Mendelson’s FOL are different ways —seemingly equivalent
modulo the specificities of each system— of capturing the idea of DT above.
The situation is explained by Hakli and Negri [HN12] as follows. For some
logics, either one modifies their rules in order for them to deal adequately with
assumptions, and get the “standard formulation” of the deduction theorem, or
30A proof rule is of the form: from ⊢ φ, infer ⊢ ψ. An inference rule is of the form: from φ,
infer ψ. The necessitation rule and generalization rules are sometimes defined as proof-rules:
from ⊢ φ, infer ⊢ φ; from ⊢ ψ(x) infer ⊢ ∀xψ(x). Notice that both φ and ψ(x) must be
theorems in their respective systems, otherwise one gets implausible inferences: from p it
follows p, and from P (x) it follows that ∀xP (x).
31Other formulation is given in [HN12]: if Γ, φ ⊢K ψ, and the rule of necessitation is applied
m ≥ 0 times to formulas that depend on φ, then Γ ⊢K (
0φ∧ ...∧mφ)→ ψ, where 0φ = φ,
1φ = φ, etc.
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leave the rules from the logic intact and obtain a “non-standard” form of the
deduction theorem.32
Now let us come back to the issue of preservation of meta-properties by
translations. Consider IPL and modal logic S4, presented in the framework
of (hyper) contextual translations, e.g. both equipped with a common set of
propositional variables p1, p2, ... and schematic variables ξ1, ξ2, ..., X1, X2, ..., for
formulas and sets of formulas, respectively, etc. Consider Go¨del’s translation
T g : IPL −→ S4 (defined to be literal to schematic variables):
T g(pi) = pi
T g(Xi) = Xi
T g(ξi) = ξi
T g(¬φ) = ¬T g(φ)
T g(φ→ ψ) = (T g(φ)→ T g(ψ))
literal for ⊥,∧,∨.
Then the deduction theorem for IPL is defined as the following meta-
property
(P ) if X, ξ1 ⊢ ξ2, then X ⊢ ξ1 → ξ2.
Carnielli et al. ([CCD09, p. 13]) notice that T g above is not a contextual
translation since S4 does not satisfy
T g(P ) if X, ξ1 ⊢ ξ2, then X ⊢ (ξ1 → ξ2).
To see why, instantiate X to p1 → p2 and ξi to pi, for i ∈ {1, 2}. In S4 it
holds that p1 → p2, p1 ⊢ p2, but it does not hold that p1 → p2 ⊢ (p1 → p2).
One can see clearly that this is caused by the transparency given in T g to
the schematic variables of P . If P were formulated in terms of non-schematic
formulas, e.g.
(P ′) if Γ, p1 ⊢ p2, then Γ ⊢ p1 → p2,
then its translation T g(P ′) into S4 would be
T g(P ′) if T g[Γ],p1 ⊢ p2, then T g[Γ] ⊢ (p1 → p2),
which is satisfied in S4.
Although P is a correct formulation of DT (see above) for IPL, T g(P ) is
not the correct formulation of DT for S4. Therefore, the claim that contex-
tual and hyper-contextual translations preserve the meta-properties of logics
(expressible in the framework) is not entirely justified. The opacity given for
the schematic variables may give a“false negative” as regards the presence of
some meta-property in the target logic, this would prevent the definition of such
translations. Therefore this framework is not adequate for our purposes.
General statement and preservation of the deduction theorem Recall
our discussion on the deduction theorem. We saw that there are many formu-
lations of it, and it depends on how the notion of proof from assumptions is
treated in each logic. Now to talk about the preservation of deduction theorem
32Although the moral of the story holds for first-order logic, as shown above, they only men-
tioned modal logics. Nevertheless, we do not know of any such rectification for the formulation
of the deduction theorem in Lukasiewicz L3.
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through the translations, we have to give a sufficiently general formulation of
it, but such that it still carries the spirit of Zeman’s definition. Let us give it a
more direct formulation:
Definition 3.14 (standard deduction theorem). A logic L1 has the stan-
dard deduction theorem whenever it holds that φ1, ..., φn ⊢L1 ψ if and only if
φ1, ..., φn−1 ⊢L1 φn → ψ.
The general formulation has to be lax enough so as to enable one to say that,
for example, the translation T l : CPL −→ L3 preserves the deduction theorem,
since it holds that “if Γ, φ ⊢L3 ψ, then Γ ⊢L3 φ → (φ → ψ)”; analogously for
the translation of IPL into S4. The general version of the deduction theorem
we propose is the following:
Definition 3.15 (general deduction theorem). A logic L1 has the general
deduction theorem whenever φ1, ..., φn ⊢L1 ψ iff φ1, ..., φn−1 ⊢L1 α
→(φn, ψ),
where α→ is an L1-formula, with one or more occurrences of φn and ψ.
In abstract algebraic logic this formulation is known as the uniterm global
deduction-detachment theorem [FJP03, p. 36].
Definition 3.16 (preservation of the general deduction theorem). A translation
T : L1 −→ L2 is said to preserve the general deduction theorem whenever L1 has
the standard deduction theorem and T (L1) has the general deduction theorem.
The case where L1 satisfies only the general deduction theorem is more
complex, as it will be seen below.
3.17 expressivenessgg: a sufficient condition for expressive-
ness
In the adequacy criteria we proposed for expressiveness, there appears two in-
formal necessary conditions: preserving the connectives and behaving in the
appropriate way as regards the selected meta-properties. The other condition
of being a non-trivial pre-order is already given precisely. The first two con-
ditions are open to interpretation, so we proposed a precise formulation of the
minimal requirements such interpretations would have to satisfy. This amounted
on requiring the translation to preserve the general deduction theorem, and to
be back-and-forth general-recursive.
The one-way mappings between logics are a very weak in the sense they
are almost omnipresent, so that requiring back-and-forth mappings as a formal
necessary condition for expressiveness is rather uncontroversial. Nevertheless,
requiring structure-attentive translations in order to preserve the connectives
has been questioned by Mossakowski et al. as we have seen above. They pro-
posed other way to preserve the connectives without requiring such translations.
We think this approach has some downsides and proposed a different one, based
on general-recursive translations.
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Being a general-recursive mapping is a relatively weak condition on transla-
tions. If some translation does not comply with it is because at least some con-
nective of the source logic is only translated “globally”, i.e. a formula containing
it is translated as a whole, and the translation ignores its eventual sub-formulas,
e.g. Glivenko’s double negation translation of CPL into IPL [Gli29].
Thus, it is reasonable to require general-recursiveness as a formal necessary
condition for expressiveness, along with the back-and-forth condition. One very
important issue to be dealt with in a future work is already pointed out by
Mossakowski et al. ([MDT09]): this minimal notion of structure preservation
is up to now only defined for propositional logics. It is to be investigated how
it should deal with quantifiers. Notice, however, that this limitation does not
weaken the necessary character of general-recursive translations, as an eventual
wider approach should include it.
Before we present a sufficient formal criterion for our concept, whose content
surely is no surprise by now, some adjustments must be made concerning the
preservation of the general deduction theorem. The general statement of the
deduction theorem still involves compositionality: the formula α→(φn, ψ) at
issue should have φn and ψ as sub-formulas. In order to assure this, we have
to define a slightly stricter notion of general-recursive translation, which we call
general-recursiveC:
Definition 3.18 (general-recursiveC). A translation T is general-recursiveC iff
T is general-recursive and it is compositional for the conditional symbol, that is,
for a formula φ→ ψ in the source logic and a template-formula CT (p1, ..., pn) in
the target logic, T (φ → ψ) = CT (T (φ), ..., T (ψ)). Thus the translated formula
may contain as sub-formulas one or more occurrences of T (φ) and T (ψ).
The restriction on general-recursive translations is intended to assure that
for the logics satisfying the standard deduction theorem, at least the translation
clause for the conditional is compositional. This will rule out clauses such
as T (φ → ψ) = CT (Ti1(φ), ..., Tin (φ), ..., Tj1 (ψ), ..., Tjn(ψ)), for Tij different
from T . Otherwise, it could happen that the resulting translation CT of the
conditional φ → ψ does not contain T (φ) and T (ψ) as sub-formulas. Then it
would not be reasonable to say that such formula CT expresses the deductibility
relation between T (φ) and T (ψ).
Now we present a sufficient criterion for expressiveness
Definition 3.19 (expressivenessgg). A logic L2 is at least as expressivegg as
L1 if and only if there is a back-and-forth general-recursive (for short, B&F-GR)
translation T from L1 to L2, such that T does not require model-mappings. If
L1 satisfy the standard deduction theorem, then T must be general-recursiveC .
Below it will be shown that expressivenessgg satisfies the adequacy criteria
given above.
3.19.1 Adequacy criterion 1
As we mentioned before (section 3.7.1) there is some consensus in the literature
that preservation of connectives requires at least compositional back-and-forth
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translations. The various non-compositional translations show that we could
have a wider notion of preservation of connectives. We now argue that through
general-recursive translations and some other conditions, it is still guaranteed
that whatever can be said in terms of the source connectives can be said in
terms of the target connectives.
Proposition 3.20 (Connetive preservation (general sense)). If a translation
T : L1 −→ L2 is back-and-forth and general-recursive (B&F-GR), and T does
not require model translations to convey the meaning of some connective in L1,
then the connectives of L1 are preserved (in a general sense) in L2.
The back-and-forth condition shall mean either a theoremhood- or deriva-
bility-preserving translation, depending on whether one is considering formula
logics or Tarskian logics, respectively. A back-and-forth translation assures a
certain similarity between the global deductive behaviour of the source and
target formulas. Though, as Jerˇa´bek’s result shows, it is not enough for any
reasonable notion of connective preservation and there must be some extent of
structure preservation. In this sense, the advantage of compositional transla-
tions is that they are particularly regular, so that each connective in the source
is associated to a fixed schema in the target logic, and the translation clauses are
clearer. But this can be also a limitation on the means of translation, compara-
ble to restricting translations in ordinary language to word-to-word mappings.
There are many cases of logics where the translation of certain operators
must consider their context, so that they have to be translated in block. We gave
before some examples, for another one consider Balbani and Herzig’s [BH94]
translation T bh of modal provability logic G into K4. For T bh the result of
translating φ also depends on whether it occurs in the scope of a negation sign:
T bh(¬p) = ¬p, but T (p) = (p → p). These cases cannot be captured
in compositional translations and can only be dealt with in more complex non-
compositional ones.
The following clause is proposed as a refinement of adequacy criterion 1,
capturing more precisely when a connective or group of connectives is generally
preserved by a translation from L1 to L2.
(α)
for each n-ary (composite) connective ⊗ in L1 and L1-formulas
φ1, ..., φn, there must be L2-formulas δ⊗(p1, ..., pm) (possibly m 6= n)
and ψ1, ..., ψm such that ⊗(φ1, ..., φn) has a similar deductive behaviour
with δ⊗(ψ1/p1, ..., ψm/pm).
It is easy to see that back-and-forth general-recursive (B&F-GR) transla-
tions satisfy clause (α). In general-recursive translations, every connective of
the source logic must be given inductive translation clauses, and translations for
composite connectives may be given either as extra clauses, or by means of auxil-
iary translations. Thus, for a n-ary (composite) connective ⊗ in L1, the formula
⊗(φ1, ..., φn) must be mapped by a GR-translation to a formula δ⊗(ψ1, ..., ψm),
where each ψi is obtained from the translation of some φk. Now if the transla-
tion is back-and forth, then ⊗(φ1, ..., φn) will have a similar deductive behaviour
with δ⊗(ψ1, ..., ψm), since Γ ⊢L1 ⊗(φ1, ..., φn) iff T (Γ) ⊢L2 δ
⊗(ψ1, ..., ψm).
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Nevertheless, the satisfaction of (α) is still not enough guarantee for general
preservation of connectives, as Epstein’s translation T E : R −→ CPL we saw
above (section 2.9.1) is B&F-GR. We asserted then that the relatedness impli-
cation “→” is not expressible in CPL. The issue is that T E uses the backdoor
of the model-mapping to make the translated formula (p ⊃ q)∧ dp,q true when-
ever the source formula p→ q is true. However, if uninterpreted, the translated
formula does not have the same meaning as the original formula. Thus, the
meaning of the relatedness implication is not really expressed in terms of the
connectives of CPL.
Thus, the last part of the proposition above is intended to force the source
connectives to be defined entirely in terms of the target connectives and not
smuggled by the model-translations.33
Therefore, if T : L1 −→ L2 is B&F-GR, then the clause (α) is satisfied. If be-
sides the translations of the connectives are not aided by model-mappings, then
it is reasonable to say that everything expressible in terms of the connectives of
L1 are expressible in terms of the connectives of L2.
In the beginning of the section we cited proposals for preservation of con-
nectives via translations by Wo´jcicki, Epstein and Mossakowski et al. The pro-
posal above is much weaker than the first two. As regards the Mossakowski et
al.’s, this approach is both weaker and stronger: stronger since it requires some
preservation of structure; and weaker since it does not require the preservation
of the proof-theoretic connectives.
3.20.1 Adequacy criterion 2
Deduction-theorem In the adequacy criteria we asked that if a logic L1 has
the standard deduction theorem, and L2 is at least as expressive as L1, then the
language fragment of L2 as expressive as L1 has the general deduction theorem.
We formulated above the standard deduction theorem and a general version of
it. As it will be seen below, in order to guarantee the preservation of the general
deduction theorem, the source logic must have the standard deduction theorem.
We fist remark that conservative general-recursiveC translations preserve the
general deduction theorem:
Proposition 3.21. Let L1 with conditional symbol “→” satisfy the standard
deduction theorem. If T : L1 −→ L2 is a conservative general-recursiveC trans-
lation, then T (L1) has the general deduction theorem.
Proof. Let the hypotheses of the proposition be satisfied.
Then T (φ1),...,T (φn) ⊢L2 T (ψ) iff φ1, ..., φn ⊢L1 ψ iff φ1, ..., φn−1 ⊢L1 φn → ψ,
(by the standard deduction theorem) iff T (φ1), ..., T (φn−1) ⊢L2 T (φn → ψ).
33This might be seen as forcing the connectives in a certain logic to be given first an
adequate set of axioms/rules of inference in order to be translatable. This would agree with
Zucker maxim that the meanings of the connectives must not be imposed from the outside
[Zuc78, p. 518]. Nevertheless, this restriction does not prohibit non-axiomatizable model-
theoretic logics to be translated into each other. For example, the identity mapping from
L(Q0) to L(Q0, Q1) is a perfectly reasonable translation and would comply with the criterion
above.
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By the definition of general-recursiveC translations, T (φn → ψ) is a formula
containing one or more occurrences of T (φn) and T (ψ). Thus, the image of L1
under T have a general deduction theorem.
To preserve the general deduction theorem the source logic must have the
stronger one. If L1 only satisfies the general deduction theorem and T : L1 −→
L2 is B&F-GR, we cannot guarantee that T (L1) satisfies the general deduction
theorem.
If L1 satisfies the general deduction theorem, then φ1, ..., φn ⊢L1 ψ iff it
holds that φ1, ..., φn−1 ⊢L1 δ
→(φn, ψ), for some L1-formula δ→. Then we have
that T (φ1), ..., T (φn) ⊢L2 T (ψ) iff T (φ1), ..., T (φn−1) ⊢L2 T (δ
→). As δ→ con-
tains φn and ψ as sub-formulas and T is general-recursive, T (δ→) will contain
Tj1(φn), ..., Tjn(ψ) as sub-formulas. If Tj1, ..., Tjn are equal to T , then the com-
positionality of the deduction theorem is saved and T (L1) has also a general
deduction theorem. Else, if Tj1, ..., Tjn are distinct from T , then the general-
deduction theorem is not preserved in T (L1).
Therefore the present approach is limited in that the source logics to be
analysed in terms of expressiveness have to be put in “proper form” so that
they satisfy the standard deduction theorem or an even wider version of it must
be defined, dropping the compositionality requirement.
Non-triviality A logic L is non-trivial if for some L-formulas φ and ψ it holds
that φ 6⊢L ψ. By the adequacy criteria, a trivial logic cannot be more expressive
than any logic. Thus, we have to make sure that a translation intended to induce
expressiveness must reflect triviality or, alternatively, preserve non-triviality.
That is, if T : L1 −→ L2, and L2 is trivial, then L1 is trivial.
Proposition 3.22 (triviality reflection). All back-and-forth translations reflect
triviality.
Undecidability We commented before that the presence of decidability could
be used as an indicator of the adequacy of our definition. This is because
decidability is a limitation of expressiveness of a logic. Thus the condition
requires that
if L1 is undecidable and L2 is decidable, then L2 is not more expres-
sive than L1.
The result below shows this condition is normally satisfied.
Proposition 3.23 ([FD01]). If L1 is undecidable, then there is no computable
back-and-forth translation T : L1 −→ L2, where L2 is decidable.
If a logic L1 is undecidable, L2 is decidable and T : L1 −→ L2 is B&F, then
it follows that T would not be computable. In this case, T apparently would
not be general-recursive.
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3.23.1 Adequacy criterion 3
Non-trivial pre-order The non-triviality part of the pre-order is already
fulfilled by a proposition above: there are two logics L1,L2, such that L1 is non-
trivial, L2 is trivial and there is no back-and-forth translation from L1 to L2.
We have to prove that back-and-forth general-recursive (recall the abbreviation
B&F-GR) translations are transitive, that they are reflexive is clear.
If T : L1 −→ L2 is surjective back-and-forth and T ′ : L2 → L3 is back-and-
forth, then T ′ ◦ T : L1 −→ L3 is a back-and-forth translation [FD01].
Now if T : L1 −→ L2 and T ′ : L2 −→ L3 are both B&F-GR, being T
additionally surjective, then T ′ ◦T is also B&F-GR. To see it, let C1, ..., Cn and
C′1, ..., C
′
n be the translation clauses for T and T
′, respectively. By surjectivity,
each L2-formula is reached by some L1-formula through the applications of
C1, ..., Cn. Thus to obtain a general-recursive mapping, is just to combine the
application of the two set of clauses. Take a L1-formula φ and obtain through
C1, ...Cn an L2-formula T (φ). Now apply C′1, ..., C
′
n to T (φ) to obtain an L3-
formula T ′(T (φ)). This translation is B&F, and is general-recursiveC, since it
is obtained through the clauses C1, ..., Cn, C
′
1, ..., C
′
n.
Nevertheless, the surjectiveness requirement may be difficult to comply with,
if one is comparing increasingly expressive logics (through language extension),
e.g. propositional logic, modal logic, first-order logic. We should find a way to
guarantee that whenever T : L1 −→ L2 and T ′ : L2 −→ L3 are B&F-GR, then
there is a B&F-GR translation T ∗ (not necessarily T ′ ◦ T ) from L1 to L3.
Let us suppose T : L1 −→ L2 is a non-surjective B&F-GR and that T ′ :
L2 −→ L3 is B&F-GR. There is naturally a weakened version T w of T ′ ◦ T , the
weaker part being in the way back of L3-formulas to L1-formulas. That is, for
L1-formulas φ1, ψ1, it holds that if φ1 ⊢L1 ψ1, then T
′(T (φ1)) ⊢L3 T
′(T (ψ1)).
But the converse direction only holds partially.
In order that the converse direction hold, instead of normally taking L3-
formulas φ3, ψ3 in the range of T ′(L2), one has to take L3-formulas in the
intersected range of T ′ ◦ T . For such L3-formulas φ3, ψ3, with T ′ ◦ T (φ1) = φ3
and T ′ ◦ T (ψ1) = ψ3 for some L1-formulas φ1, ψ1, it holds that if φ3 ⊢L3 ψ3,
then φ1 ⊢L1 ψ1.
But this is exactly what we wanted. The backward direction should hold only
for those L3 formulas that are linked with L1-formulas through L2-formulas. To
translate L1-formulas into L3 formulas T w takes only the T ′-clauses C′1, ...C
′
n
involved in translating T (L1) formulas.
Thus, this weakened version of T ′ ◦ T will suffice for us to conclude that
whenever there are B&F-GR translations T : L1 −→ L2 and T ′ : L2 −→ L3,
then there is a B&F-GR translation T w : L1 −→ L3.
There remains the question whether this T w will preserve the general de-
duction theorem. This will happen whenever T is compositional for “→” and
the translation clause of T ′ for the formula T (φ → ψ) is compositional. Then
T ′(T (φ → ψ)) is an L3-formula containing T ′(T (φ)) and T ′(T (ψ)) as sub-
formulas, which implies that T w preserves the general deduction theorem.
Therefore we have that
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Proposition 3.24. Back-and-forth general-recursive translations form a non-
trivial pre-order on logics.
From the above propositions we can conclude that
Corollary 3.25. Every back-and-forth general-recursive translation preserves
the connectives and the selected meta-properties (undecidability, non-triviality
and general deduction theorem) and form a non-trivial pre-order on logics.
This implies that
Corollary 3.26. Every back-and-forth general-recursive translation not aided
by model-mappings agrees with adequacy criteria 1,2 and 3.
Many well known translations intuitively giving rise to an expressiveness
relation satisfy expressivenessgg. In the sequence, we briefly present them.
3.27 Corroborating expressivenessgg: the structure preserv-
ing translations
For the sake of supporting our notion of translational expressiveness, there fol-
lows some translations obeying the criterion that are reasonably taken as induc-
ing an expressiveness relation.
• (Wo´jcicki) from CPL into L3:
T l(pi) = pi T
l(¬φ) = T l(φ)→ ¬T l(φ)
T l(φ→ ψ) = T l(φ)→ (T l(φ)→ T l(ψ))
• (Gentzen) from classical first-order logic CL into intuitionistic first-order
logic (IL), and also from CL to Minimal first-order logic (M) [PM68, p.
218]:34
T c(Pt1...tn) = ¬¬Pt1...tn T c(φ ∨ ψ) = ¬(¬T c(φ) ∧ ¬T c(ψ))
T c(∃xφ) = ¬∀x¬T c(φ) literal for ⊥,∧,→ and ∀;
• (Go¨del) from IL to CL extended with the modal system S4:
T s(Rit1...tn) = Rit1...tn T s(∀xφ) = ∀x(T s(φ))
T s(φ→ ψ) = (T s(φ)→ T s(ψ)) literal for ⊥,∧,∨ and ∃;
• (Prawitz and Malmna¨s) from IL to M (for # ∈ {∧,∨,→}):
T m1(Rit1, ..., tn) = Rit1, ..., tn ∨ ⊥ T m1(∀xφ) = ∀x(T m1(φ) ∨ ⊥)
T m1(φ # ψ) = (T m1(φ) # T m1(ψ)) ∨ ⊥ T m1(⊥) = ⊥;
34M is the intuitionistic logic without the rule of ex falso quodlibet. An interesting result
due to Luiz Carlos Pereira and Herman Haeusler [PH16] is that this translation maps CL to
any intermediate logic between M and CL.
36
• (Demri and Gore´) from Grz to S4:
T+(φ) = ([T+(φ)→ T−(φ)] → T+(φ)) T−(φ) = T−(φ)
T+(¬φ) = ¬T−(φ) T−(¬φ) = ¬T+(φ)
T+(φ→ ψ) = T−(φ)→ T+(ψ) T−(φ→ ψ) = T+(φ)→ T−(ψ)
T+ and T− are literal for ∧ and atomic formulas;
• (Van Benthem) Standard translation from modal logic to FOL:
T x(pi) = Pix T x(♦φ) = ∃y(Rxy ∧ T y(φ))
T x(φ) = ∀y(Rxy → T y(φ)) literal for ¬,∧,∨,→,⊥.
4 Conclusions
The commonly used precise notions of expressiveness are defined within a frame-
work which is based on the capacity of characterizing structures, thus they apply
only to model-theoretic logics. As this framework of expressiveness is defined
only with respect to logics sharing the same class of structures, it was called in
this text “single-class expressiveness”. This framework can be seen as consisting
of certain formula-mappings between model-theoretic logics.
We saw two formal criteria for expressiveness, due to Garc´ıa-Matos and
Va¨a¨na¨nen and Kuijer, constructed in a wider framework which we called “multi-
class expressiveness”. This wider framework encompasses besides formula-map-
pings, also model-mappings. We argued that both criteria are inadequate for
multi-class expressiveness. Then it was defended that moving to an even broader
framework might be more promising, this is because the possibility of using
model-mappings, as it happens with the counter-examples presented, opens a
backdoor for “undesirable” translations. In the broader framework, which we
called “translational expressiveness”, a criterion for expressiveness would lack
semantic notions and be based exclusively in terms of the existence of certain
formula-mappings preserving the consequence relations of the logics at issue.
A proposal in this direction due to Mossakowski et al. was analysed and criti-
cized, since it also over-generates. Studying the reasons for the over-generation,
we proposed some adequacy criteria for relative expressiveness and a formal
criterion of translational expressiveness satisfying them. The criterion is still
limited in some aspects, as the notion of a structure-preserving translation is up
to now only precisely defined with respect to propositional logics. The definition
of structure-preserving translation is only intuitively extrapolated to quantifiers,
that is, one would normally recognize a structure-preserving translation clause
for a quantifier, though there is still no formal definition of it. Therefore, a truly
broad formal criterion for expressiveness encompassing preservation of quanti-
fiers is sill wanting, and we leave it for a future work.35
35As regards this limitation, it is curious to see that in Lindstro¨m’s characterization of first-
order logic as the most expressive logic satisfying countable compactness and the Lo¨wenheim-
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